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Foreign Ownership of U.S. Safe Assets: Good or Bad?
Abstract
The last 20 years have been marked by a sharp rise in international demand for U.S.
reserve assets, or safe stores-of-value. This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of these
uctuations in international capital ows in a two-sector general equilibrium model with
uninsurable idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. The model implies that the young benet
from a capital inow due to lower interest rates, which reduce the costs of home ownership
and of borrowing against higher expected future income. Middle-aged savers are hurt because
they are crowded out of the safe bond market and exposed to greater systematic risk in equity
and housing markets. Although they are partially compensated for this in equilibrium by
higher risk premia, they still su¤er from lower expected rates of return on their savings. By
contrast, retired individuals, who are drawing down assets and who receive social security
income that is least sensitive to the current aggregate state, benet handsomely from the rise
in asset values that accompanies a capital inow. Under the veil of ignorance,newborns
gain from foreign purchases of the safe asset and would be willing to forgo up to 1% of
lifetime consumption in order to avoid a large capital outow. JEL: G11, G12, E44, E21
1 Introduction
The last 20 years have been marked by a sharp rise in international demand for U.S. reserve
assets, or safe stores-of-value. This has led to an unprecedented degree of foreign ownership of
U.S. government and government-backed debt, most of it held by Foreign O¢ cial Institutions
such as central banks. In 1995, foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries amounted to 17% of
marketable Treasuries outstanding. By June 2008, foreigners owned 61% of all U.S. federal
government debt. These trends have raised questions about the sustainability of large global
imbalancesbetween the demand for and supply of U.S. reserve assets, and they have invited
speculation over the possible economic consequences of a sell-o¤ of U.S. debt by foreign
governments.1
Despite a vigorous academic debate on the question of whether global imbalances are
a fundamentally benign or detrimental phenomenon,2 little is known about the potential
welfare consequences of these changes in international capital ows, or of foreign ownership
of U.S. safe assets in particular. We argue here that a complete understanding of the welfare
implications requires a model with realistic heterogeneity, life-cycle dynamics, and plausible
nancial markets. For example, foreign purchases of domestic bonds reduce interest rates,
which could benet the young who are in a borrowing stage of the life-cycle. On the other
hand, demand for U.S. bonds by foreign governmental holders crowds domestic savers out
of the safe bond market, exposing them to greater systematic risk in equity and housing
markets. Thus, middle-aged savers are potentially hurt both by lower interest rates and rates
of return, and by greater exposure to systematic risk. In the limit, as rising governmental
ownership drives domestic interest rates to zero, non-governmental investors are forced to
take on ever greater risk with their savings in order to earn a non-negligible return.
This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of foreign ownership of U.S. safe assets. We
study a two-sector general equilibrium model of housing and non-housing production where
heterogeneous agents face limited opportunities to insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate
risks. The model is su¢ ciently general so as to account for the endogenous interactions
among nancial and housing wealth, output and investment, interest rates, consumption and
wealth inequality and risk premia in both housing and equity assets. The model economy
is populated by a large number of overlapping generations of households who receive utility
from both housing and nonhousing consumption and who face a stochastic life-cycle earnings
1See for example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2009), Bernanke (2011) and Fahri, Gourinchas, and Rey (2011).
2See Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007), Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008a), Caballero,
Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008b), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2009), and Caballero (2009).
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prole. We introduce market incompleteness by modeling heterogeneous agents who face
idiosyncratic and aggregate risks against which they cannot perfectly insure, and by imposing
collateralized borrowing constraints on households. A crucial source of aggregate risk in the
model is a shock to foreign ownership of the domestic riskless bond, calibrated to match U.S.
data. This shock a¤ects asset values and welfare because it alters the e¤ective supply of safe
assets available to domestic households.
An important aspect of recent patterns in international capital ows is that foreign de-
mand for U.S. Treasury securities is dominated by Foreign O¢ cial Institutions who take ex-
tremely inelastic positions, implying that when these holders receive funds to invest they buy
U.S. Treasuries regardless of price (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010)). More-
over, the persistent and growing U.S. trade decits since 1994 have been nanced almost
exclusively by an upward trend in net foreign holdings of U.S. assets considered to be safe
stores-of-value (i.e., Treasury and Agency debt). By contrast, net foreign holdings of risky
securities have uctuated near zero. In this paper, we study the welfare implications of
precisely this kind of international capital ow, namely uctuations in net foreign inows by
governmental holders who inelastically place all of their funds in the domestic riskless bond.
The model economy implies that foreign purchases (or sales) of the safe asset have quanti-
tatively important distributional consequences, reecting tradeo¤s between generations, and
between economic groups distinguished by wealth and income. Welfare outcomes are inu-
enced by the endogenous response of asset markets to uctuations in foreign holdings of the
safe asset. A capital inow has an economically important downward impact on the risk-free
interest rate, consistent with empirical evidence.3 Although lower interest rates boost equity
and home prices relative to measures of fundamental value, foreign purchases of the domestic
riskless bond also reduce the e¤ective supply of the safe asset, thereby exposing domestic
savers to greater systematic risk in equity and housing markets. In response, risk premia on
housing and equity assets rise, substantially (but not fully) o¤setting the stimulatory impact
of lower interest rates on home and equity prices.
These factors imply that the young and the old experience welfare gains from a capital
inow, while middle-aged savers su¤er. The young benet from lower interest rates, which
reduce the costs of home ownership and of borrowing in anticipation of higher expected
future income. Middle-aged savers are hurt because they are crowded out of the safe bond
market and exposed to greater systematic risk in equity and housing markets. Although
they are partially compensated for this in equilibrium by higher risk-premia, they still su¤er
3See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), Warnock and Warnock (2009), and Bernanke (2011).
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from lower expected rates of return on their savings. By contrast, retired individuals su¤er
less from lower expected rates of return, since they are drawing down assets at the end of
life. They also receive social security income that is less sensitive to the current aggregate
state than is labor income, making them more insulated from systematic risk. Taken to-
gether, these factors imply that the oldest retirees experience a signicant net gain from
even modest increases in asset values that may accompany a capital inow. We also com-
pute welfare consequences for groups that vary according to wealth and income, as well as an
ex-ante measure for agents just being born. Under the veil of ignorance,newborns benet
from foreign purchases of the safe asset and would be willing to forgo up to 1% of lifetime
consumption in order to avoid a large capital outow.
This paper is related to a literature on incomplete markets and equity pricing,4 as well as a
literature on incomplete markets and housing, or durables more generally.5 The model in this
paper has many of the same features as the incomplete markets model studied in Favilukis,
Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) (FLVN). Unlike the related incomplete markets
literature, FLVN study the economic impact of foreign purchases of U.S. assets through a
comparison of stochastic steady states. But that paper di¤ers from the present one in two
important ways. First, FLVN focused on the valuation e¤ects of changes in housing nance
and did not study the welfare consequences of international capital ows, as here. Second,
the model studied in FLVN specied capital ows as a xed fraction of output, whereas the
present paper introduces an additional source of aggregate uncertainty (a shock to foreign
holdings relative to output) that cannot be insured away. This additional source of aggregate
risk is a signicant extension of the model, since it introduces two new state variables over
which agents must form expectations; nevertheless it has important implications both for
asset markets and welfare.
This paper is also related to the literature on global imbalances in international capital
markets and, less directly, to the literature on Sudden Stops, which studies reversals of in-
ternational capital ows in emerging economies.6 Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008a)
4See Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Basak and
Cuoco (1998), Luttmer (1999), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) , Gomes and Michaelides (2008),
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), and Favilukis (2008).
5See Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), Ortalo-Magné and Rady
(2006), Peterson (2006), Ríos-Rull and Sánchez-Marcos (2006), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007, 2008),
Piazzesi and Schneider (2008), Corbae and Quintin (2009), Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2008), Fav-
ilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009), and Iacoviello and Pavan (2009).
6The application of this paper is to the developed economy of the United States. For a classication of
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and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) (discussed further below) study the economic con-
sequences of capital inows in representative agent economies, but do not study the welfare
outcomes of these ows. A premise of this paper is that a complete understanding of the
welfare implications requires a model with reasonable heterogeneity, life-cycle dynamics, and
plausible nancial markets. Although the model we study does not match every aspect of
the data perfectly, it produces reasonable implications for nancial markets on key dimen-
sions that are likely to be important for welfare, such as equity and housing risk premia and
Sharpe ratios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the recent
history of foreign purchases of U.S. government securities, and how we model them. Section
3 describes the model, including the dynamics of foreign holdings of domestic bonds, the
equilibrium, the welfare measures, and the calibration. Section 4 presents the results, focus-
ing on the macroeconomic, asset market, and welfare consequences of uctuations in foreign
ownership of the domestic safe asset. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Modeling Recent Trends in International Capital Flows
A key development in the international capital markets of recent years is the surge in foreign
ownership of U.S. Government debt and Government-backed debt. Foreign ownership of
U.S. Treasuries (T-bonds and T-notes) increased from $118 billion in 1984, or 13.5% of
marketable Treasuries outstanding, to $3.6 trillion in 2008, or 61% of marketable Treasuries
(Figure 1). Foreign holdings of U.S. agency and Government Sponsored Enterprise-backed
agency securities quintupled between 2000 and 2007, rising from $261 billion to $1.3 trillion,
or from 7% to 21% of total agency debt. Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury (short- and
long-term) and long-term Agency debt (we have no data on short-term Agency debt) as a
fraction of GDP more than doubled from 14% to 35% over the period 2000-2008 and stands
at 34% at the end of our sample in June 2010.
Figure 2 shows the fraction of foreign holdings relative to trend U.S. gross domestic
product (GDP). The gure reports both the raw series, as well as a series adjusted in 2009
and 2010 for the large increase in the quantity of Treasury debt outstanding that occurred
in 2009. The adjusted series equals the level of foreign holdings as a fraction of trend GDP
that would have occurred in 2009 and 2010 had Treasury debt outstanding as a fraction of
trend GDP been xed at its 2008 level. For the unadjusted series, foreign holdings more than
Sudden Stops in emerging economies, see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006).
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doubled from 2001 to 2010, increasing from 15% of trend GDP in 2001 to 35.5% by June
2010. But the adjusted series implies that foreign holdings were just 24.6% of trend GDP
in June 2010, 10.6% lower than the unadjusted gure. This suggests that an unwinding of
global imbalances, at least relative to trend GDP, may have been underway by the end of
our sample.
The rise in net holdings by foreigners over time has coincided with downward trend
in interest rates. Both 30-year xed rate mortgages and the 10-year Treasury bond yield
trended downward, with mortgage rates declining from around 18 percent in the early 1980s
to near 6 percent by the end of 2007, to an all-time low of 4.2% in October 2010. The decline
in nominal rates was not merely attributable to a decline in ination: the real annual interest
rate on the ten-year Treasury bond fell from 3.5% at the start of 2000 to -0.2% at the end
of 2008 using the consumer price index as a measure of ination. It subsequently increased
to 1.6% by the end of 2010. A similar percentage decline in the real rate is indicated from
data on Treasury Ination Protected bonds.7
We model changes in net capital ows directly and calibrate them to match U.S. data,
following a stochastic process specied below. We do not specify the sources of these changes
or take a stand on the model of international trade that gives rise to them in equilibrium.
Note that it is unnecessary to do so to close the model: in the resource constraint of the
economy, the trade balance is simply the negative of the net change in the value of foreign
holdings of domestic assets, a variable that endogenously inuences the quantity of domestic
consumption and investment relative to domestic output.
By not modeling the mechanics of trade adjustment, it is possible that we could miss one
channel (often emphasized for small open economies or for developing economies) through
which changes in the terms of trade inuence measured total factor productivity (TFP) of the
manufacturing sector. Specically, if imported and domestic inputs are imperfect substitutes,
then movements in the relative prices of these goods can impact rm productivity, either by
altering the number of varieties used or by altering the quality mix of domestic and foreign
inputs. Gopinath and Neiman (2011) study the Argentinean economy and nd that such
trade adjustments deliver quantitatively important declines in manufacturing TFP.
7To compute the real interest rate, we use the 10-year constant maturity Treasury rate and subtract
realized ination over the preceding 12 months. We then take a 12-month moving average of this series to
smooth it out. We also investigate 10-year Treasury Ination Protected (TIPS) rates, which are available
from 2003 onward from FRED II and from McCulloch from 1997 to 2003. Using the same 12 month moving
average, we nd that real 10-year TIPS yields were 4.0% at the start of 2000 and fall to 1.8% by the end of
2008. They fall further to 1.15% by the end of 2010.
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While such a terms-of-trade channel might be important for the U.S. economy, we do
not pursue modeling it here, for two reasons. First, the added complexity would greatly
complicate the numerical solution procedure, requiring us to compromise other aspects of
the framework. Second and more signicantly, there appears to be little if any direct evidence
on how important such a channel might be for the U.S. manufacturing sector, let alone for
the U.S. economy as a whole. For example, if a trade balance movement coincides with
changes in the usage of all inputs (domestic and foreign), with no movements in relative
shares, this channel is less important. Also, if U.S. domestic inputs can be substituted for
foreign inputs, then this channel is again weakened. More research is needed to determine
how signicant such channels are for the U.S. economy.
Interest rates in the model are determined in equilibrium by a market clearing condition
for bondholders. We introduce foreign demand for domestic bonds into the market clearing
condition. Hereafter we refer to foreign ownership of domestic riskless asset interchangeably
as foreign capital or external leverage. This foreign capital is modeled as owned by govern-
mental holders who inelastically place all of their funds in domestic riskless bonds. We do
this for two reasons. First, as recent data shows, Foreign O¢ cial Institutions own the vast
majority of U.S. Treasuries: in June 2010 Foreign O¢ cial Institutions held 75% of all foreign
holdings of U.S. Treasuries. As explained in Kohn (2002), government entities have specic
regulatory and reserve currency motives for holding U.S. Treasuries and face both legal and
political restrictions on the type of assets that can be held, forcing them into safe securities.
Second, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) nd that demand for U.S. Treasury
securities by governmental holders is extremely inelastic, implying that when these holders
receive funds to invest they buy U.S. Treasuries, regardless of their price. In the model,
we assume domestic borrowers may obtain credit collateralized by home equity at a xed
interest rate spread with the governmental rate.8 Because our model abstracts from default,
we set this spread to zero in our calibration.
The model here is intended to study changes in capital ows that result from changes in
the net foreign holdings of the domestic safe asset. We do not model trends in net foreign
holdings of risky securities. Figure 3 shows why: net foreign holdings of risky securities as
a fraction of U.S. Trend GDP have hovered close to zero since 1994, even as net foreign
holdings of safe assets (dened as U.S. Treasury and Agency securities) have soared. Thus
8In practice, government debt and mortgage debt are not dissimilar. After the start of the conservatorship
of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in September 2008, half of government debt was Government-sponsored
Agency debt that backed mortgages.
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Figure 3 shows that all of the upward trend in net foreign holdings of U.S. securities since
1994 has been the result of an upward trend in net foreign holdings of safe assets; net foreign
holdings of risky assets are almost exactly zero in June of 2010.
3 The Model
This section describes the model economy with two productive sectors. Time is discrete
and each period t corresponds to a year. The economy grows deterministically at rate g.
The exogenous aggregate shocks of the model include a stationary shock to foreign capital
relative to trend GDP, and stationary technology shocks Zk;t, one to each of the two sectors
indexed by k, that have both a deterministic component and stochastic component, i.e.,
Zk;t = exp (gt) zk;t, where zk;t is a stationary technology shock. The variable exp (gt) is trend
output, interchangeably denoted Y t  exp (gt).
3.1 Firms
The production side of the economy consists of two sectors. One sector produces the non-
housing consumption good, and the other sector produces the housing good. We refer to
the rst as the consumption sector and the second as the housing sector.A house in
our model is a residential durable asset that provides utility to the household, is illiquid
(expensive to trade), and can be used as collateral in debt obligations. In each period, a
representative rm in each sector chooses labor (which it rents) and investment in capital
(which it owns) to maximize the value of the rm to its owners.
3.1.1 Consumption Sector
Denote output in the consumption sector as
YC;t  Z1 C;t KC;tN1 C;t
where ZC;t is the stochastic productivity level at time t, KC is the capital stock in the
consumption sector,  is the share of capital, and NC is the quantity of labor input in the
consumption sector. Let IC denote investment in the consumption sector. The rms capital
stock KC;t accumulates over time subject to proportional adjustment costs, C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t,
modeled as a deduction from the earnings of the rm. The rm does not issue new shares and
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nances its capital stock entirely through retained earnings. The dividends to shareholders
are equal to
DC;t = YC;t  WtNC;t   IC;t   C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t:
The rm maximizes the present discounted value VC;t of a stream of dividends:
VC;t = max
NC;t;IC;t
Et
1X
k=0
kt+k
t
DC;t; (1)
where 
kt+k
t
is a stochastic discount factor discussed below, and Wt is the wage rate (equal
across sectors in equilibrium). The evolution equation for the rms capital stock is
KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t;
where  is the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
3.1.2 Housing Sector
The housing rms problem is analogous to the problem solved by the representative rm in
the consumption sector, except that housing production utilizes an additional xed factor of
production, Lt, representing a combination of land and government permits for residential
construction.9 Denote output in the residential housing sector as
YH;t = ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

;
YH;t represents construction of new housing (residential investment), 1    is the share
of land/permits in housing production, and  is the share of capital in the construction
component
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

of housing production. Variables denoted with an Hsubscript are
dened exactly as above for the consumption sector but now pertain to the housing sector,
e.g., ZH;t denotes the stochastic productivity level in the housing sector.
We assume that, each period, the government makes available a xed supply L of
land/permits for residential construction by renting them at the competitive rental rate
equal to the marginal product of Lt. The proceeds from land rentals are used by the govern-
ment to nance (wasteful) government spending Gt. When a house is sold, the government
9Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) argue that the increasing value of land for residential development
is tied to government-issued construction permits, rather than to the acreage itself. We do not distinguish
between these two forms of productive input and instead aggregate both forms into a single factor Lt.
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issues a transferable lease for the land/permits in perpetuity at no charge to the home-
owner. Thus, the buyer of the home operates as owner even though, by eminent domain,
the government retains the legal right to the land/permits.
Let pHt denote the relative price of housing in units of the non-housing consumption good
and let pLt+k denote the price of land/permits. Notice that p
H
t is the time t price of a unit of
housing of xed quality and quantity; it corresponds to the value of a national house-price
index. The dividends to shareholders in the housing sector are given by
DH;t = p
H
t YH;t   pLt Lt  WtNH;t   IH;t   H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t:
The housing rm maximizes
VH;t = max
NH;t;IH;t
Et
1X
k=0
kt+k
t
DH;t: (2)
Capital in the housing sector evolves:
KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t + IH;t:
Note that YH;t represents residential construction; thus the law of motion for the aggregate
residential housing stock Ht is
Ht+1 = (1  H)Ht + YH;t;
where H denotes the depreciation rate of the housing stock.
3.2 Risky Asset Returns
The rmsvalues VH;t and VC;t are the cum dividend values, measured before the dividend
is paid out. Thus the cum dividend returns to shareholders in the housing sector and the
consumption sector are dened, respectively, as
RYH ;t+1 =
VH;t+1
(VH;t  DH;t) RYC ;t+1 =
VC;t+1
(VC;t  DC;t) :
We dene V ej;t = Vj;t  Dj;t for j = H;C to be the ex dividend value of the rm.10
10Using the ex dividend value of the rm the return reduces to the more familiar ex dividend denition:
Rej;t+1 =
V ej;t+1+Dj;t+1
V ej;t
:
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3.3 Individuals
The economy is populated by A overlapping generations of individuals, indexed by a =
1; :::; A; with a continuum of individuals born each period. Individuals live through two
stages of life, a working stage and a retirement stage. Adult age begins at age 21, so a equals
this e¤ective age minus 20. Agents live for a maximum of A = 80 (100 years). Workers
live from age 21 (a = 1) to 65 (a = 45) and then retire. Retired workers die with an age-
dependent probability calibrated from life expectancy data. The probability that an agent
is alive at age a + 1 conditional on being alive at age a is denoted a+1ja. Upon death, any
remaining net worth of the individual in that period is counted as terminal consumption,
e.g., funeral and medical expenses.
Individuals have an intraperiod utility function given by
U(Ca;t; Ha;t) =
eC1  1a;t
1  1

eCa;t = hC " 1"a;t + (1  )H " 1"a;t i "" 1 ;
where eC is referred to as composite consumption, Ca;t is non-housing consumption of an
individual of age a, and Ha;t is the stock of housing, 1= is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion,  is the relative weight on non-housing consumption in utility, and " is the constant
elasticity of substitution between C and H. Implicit in this specication is the assumption
that the service ow from houses is proportional to the stock Ha;t.
Financial market trade is limited to a one-period riskless bond and to risky capital, where
the latter is restricted to be a mutual fund of equity in the housing and consumption sectors.
The mutual fund is a value-weighted portfolio with return
RK;t+1 =
V eH;t
V eH;t + V
e
C;t
RYH ;t+1 +
V eC;t
V eH;t + V
e
C;t
RYC ;t+1: (3)
The gross bond return is denoted Rf;t = 1qt 1 , where qt 1 is the bond price known at time
t  1. Individuals are born with no initial endowment of risky capital or bonds.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their labor productivity. To denote this heterogeneity, we
index individuals i. Before retirement households supply labor inelastically. The stochastic
process for individual income for workers is the product ofWt, the aggregate wage per unit of
productivity, and Lia;t, the individuals labor endowment (hours times an individual-specic
productivity factor). Labor productivity is specied by a deterministic age-specic prole,
Ga, and an individual shock Zit :
Lia;t = GaZ
i
t
ln
 
Zit

= ln
 
Zit 1

+ it; 
i
t  i:i:d:
 
0; 2t

;
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where Ga is a deterministic function of age capturing a hump-shaped prole in life-cycle
earnings and ia;t is a stochastic i.i.d. shock to individual earnings. To capture countercyclical
variation in idiosyncratic risk of the type documented by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004), we use a two-state specication for the variance of idiosyncratic earnings shocks:
2t =
(
2E if ZC;t  E (ZC;t)
2R if ZC;t < E (ZC;t)
; 2R > 
2
E (4)
This specication implies that the variance of idiosyncratic labor earnings is higher in re-
cessions(ZC;t  E (ZC;t)) than in expansions(ZC;t  E (ZC;t)). The former is denoted
with an Rsubscript, the latter with an Esubscript. The counter-cyclical increase in
income dispersion is an important contributor to the equity risk premium in our model (see
Krueger and Lustig (2010)). Finally, labor earnings are taxed at rate  in order to nance
social security retirement income.
At age a, agents enter the period with wealth invested in bonds, Bia, and shares 
i
a of
risky capital. The total number of shares outstanding of the risky asset is normalized to
unity. We rule out short-sales in the risky asset,
ia;t  0: (5)
An individual who chooses to invest in the mutual fund pays a xed, per-period participation
cost, FK;t.
We assume that the housing owned by each individual depreciates at rate H ; the rate of
depreciation of the aggregate housing stock. Households may choose to increase the quantity
of housing consumed at time t + 1 by making a net investment H ia;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t > 0.
Because houses are illiquid, it is expensive to change housing consumption. An individual
who chooses to change housing consumption pays a transaction cost F iH;t. Denote the sum
of the per period equity participation cost and housing transaction cost for individual i as
F it  F iH;t + FK;t:
Dene the individuals gross nancial wealth at time t as
W ia;t  ia;t
 
V eC;t + V
e
H;t +DC;t +DH;t

+Bia;t:
The budget constraint for an agent of age a who is not retired is
Cia;t +B
i
a+1;t+1qt + 
i
a+1;t+1
 
V eC;t + V
e
H;t
  W ia;t + (1  )WtLia;t (6)
+pHt
 
(1  H)H ia;t  H ia+1;t+1
  F it
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W ia+1;t+1    (1 $) pHt H ia;t+1; 8a; t (7)
where  is a social security tax rate and where
F iH;t =

0; H ia+1;t+1 = (1  H)H ia;t
 0 +  1p
H
t H
i
a;t; H
i
a+1;t+1 6= (1  H)H ia;t
:
FK;t =
(
0 if ia+1;t+1 = 0
F if ia+1;t+1 > 0
:
F iH;t is the housing transactions cost which contains both a xed and variable component
and depends on age only through H ia;t. Equation (7) is the collateral constraint, where
0  $  1. It says that households may borrow no more than a fraction (1 $) of the
value of housing, implying that they must post collateral equal to a fraction $ of the value
of the house. This constraint can be thought of as a down-payment constraint for new
home purchases, but it also encompasses collateral requirements for home equity borrowing
against existing homes. The constraint gives the maximum combined loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio for rst and second mortgages and home equity withdrawal. Notice that if the price
pHt of the house rises and nothing else changes, the individual can nance a greater level of
consumption of both housing and nonhousing goods and services.
Two points about the collateral constraint above are worth noting. First, it applies to
any borrowing against home equity, not just to mortgages. Second, borrowing takes place
using one-period debt. Thus, an individuals borrowing capacity uctuates period-by-period
with the value of the house.
We also prevent individuals from buying stock on margin. If the individual is a net
borrower, this means we restrict holdings of the risky asset to be zero, ia+1;t+1 = 0. This
restriction is stated mathematically as follows:
if W ia;t + (1  )WtLia;t  
 
Cia;t + p
H
t
 
H ia+1;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t
  F it  < 0 (8)
then Bia+1;t+1 < 0; 
i
a+1;t+1 = 0:
Net lenders may take a positive position in the risky asset but may not short the bond to
do so:
if W ia;t + (1  )WtLia;t  
 
Cia;t + p
H
t
 
H ia+1;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t
  F it   0 (9)
then Bia+1;t+1  0; ia+1;t+1  0:
Let Ziar denote the value of the stochastic component of individual labor productivity,
Zia;t, during the last year of working life. Each period, retired workers receive a government
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pension PEia;t = Z
i
arXt; where Xt = Wt

NW
NR

is the pension determined by a pay as you
go system, and NW and NR are the numbers of working age and retired households.11 For
agents who have reached retirement age, the budget constraint is identical to that for workers
(6) except that wage income (1  )WtLia;t is replaced by pension income PEia;t.
3.4 Stochastic Process for Capital Flows
Let BF;t denote the stochastic supply of foreign capital to the domestic bond market, i.e.,
BF;t > 0 represents a net positive bond position by foreign holders. Foreign purchases of the
riskless asset a¤ect an individuals optimization problem by inuencing the price of bonds
and appear directly in the market clearing condition for the bond market (given below).
In addition, the aggregate resource constraint for this economy (also given below) implies
that the net change in the value of foreign capital, or the trade balance, inuences current
spending relative to current resources. For this reason, both BF;t+1 and BF;t are aggregate
state variables as of time t. (Note that, given the timing convention of the budget constraint
(6), BF;t+1 is beginning of period debt and therefore is known at time t.) A positive net
foreign asset inow is identically equivalent to a trade decit (negative trade balance), which
is reected in the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
Let GDP be dened as Yt  YC;t + pHYH;t + CH;t; where CH;t is the aggregate value
of housing consumption across all households in the economy. Given a probability law for
stochastic foreign holdings, households form beliefs about their evolution. Let Y t denote
trend GDP, exp (gt), as explained above. We assume that households form beliefs according
to a stochastic process for foreign holdings relative to trend GDP, bF;t  BF;t=Y t; assumed
to evolve according to a rst-order autoregressive process:
bF;t+1 = (1  F ) b+ F bF;t + Ft+1: (10)
Below we explain how this process is calibrated to historical data on foreign holdings of U.S.
Treasury debt (available from the Department of Treasury, U.S. Government).
11The decomposition of the population into workers and retirees is determined from life-expectancy tables
as follows. Let X denote the total number of people born each period. (In practice this is calibrated to
be a large number in order to approximate a continuum.) Then NW = 45  X is the total number of
workers. Next, from life expectancy tables, if the probability of dying at age a > 45 is denoted pa then
NR =
P80
a=46 (1  pa)X is the total number of retired persons.
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3.5 Law of Motion for State Variables
Let Zt  (ZC;t; ZH;t; BF;t; BF;t+1)0 denote the exogenous aggregate states. The total aggregate
state of the economy is a pair, (Z; ) ; where  is a measure dened over S =(AZ  H),
where A = f1; 2; :::Ag is the set of ages, where Z is the set of all possible idiosyncratic shocks,
where  is the set of all possible beginning-of-period nancial wealth realizations, and where
H is the set of all possible beginning-of-period housing wealth realizations. That is,  is a
distribution of agents across ages, idiosyncratic shocks, nancial and housing wealth. The
presence of aggregate shocks implies that  evolves stochastically over time. We specify a
law of motion,  ; for ;
t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1) :
3.6 Stochastic Discount Factor
The stochastic discount factor (SDF), t+1
t
, appears in the dynamic value maximization
problem (1) and (2) undertaken by each representative rm. We assume that the represen-
tative rm discounts future prots using a weighted average of the individual shareholders
MRS in non-housing consumption,
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
, where the weights, ia;t, correspond to the
shareholders proportional ownership in the rm. (For a detailed discussion of this assump-
tion, see FLVN). Let t+1
t
denote this weighted average. Recalling that the total number of
shares in the risky portfolio is normalized to unity, we have
t+1
t

Z
S
ia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
d (11)
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
= 
26664

Cia+1;t+1
Cia;t
  1

2664+ (1  )

Hia+1;t+1
Cia+1;t+1
 " 1
"
+ (1  )

Hia;t
Cia;t
 " 1
"
3775
 "
(" 1)
37775 : (12)
Since we weight each individuals MRS by its proportional ownership (and since short-
sales in the risky asset are prohibited), only those households who are long in the risky asset
(shareholders) will receive non-zero weight in the SDF. We check that our equilibrium is not
quantitatively sensitive to this assumption on ownership control.12
12This insensitivity is predicted in a wide class of incomplete markets models in which the rms objective
is value maximization. For example, Carceles Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) show that the equilibrium
allocations in a many incomplete markets models is invariant to the choice of stochastic discount factor
within the set that includes the MRS of any household (or any weighted average of these) for whom the
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3.7 Housing and Equity Returns
Abstracting from transactions costs and borrowing constraints, the rst-order condition for
optimal housing choice is
@U
@Cia;t
=
1
pHt
Et
24 @U
@Cia+1;t+1
0@ @U@Hia+1;t+1
@U
@Cia+1;t+1
+ pHt+1 (1  H)
1A35 ; (13)
implying that each individuals housing return is given by
@U=@Hia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
+ pHt+1 (1  H)
where
@U=@Hia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
is the implicit rental price for housing services, referred to hereafter as
rent.For the national housing return, our return on a national housing index, we dene
national rent, Rt+1, as the average of @U=@H
i
a+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
across individuals. Given this denition
of national rent, we dene the corresponding national housing return as
RH;t+1  p
H
t+1 (1  H) +Rt+1
pHt
; (14)
Rt+1 
Z
S
@U=@H ia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
d: (15)
In the model, pHt is the price of a unit of housing stock, which holds xed the composition
of housing (quality, square footage, etc.) over time.
The risky capital return RK;t in (3) is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of risky
capital. This is not the same as the empirical return on equity, which is a levered claim on
risky capital. To obtain an equity return in the model, RE;t, the return on assets, RK;t, must
be adjusted for leverage:
RE;t  Rf ;t + (1 +B=E) (RK;t  Rf;t) ;
where B=E is the xed debt-equity ratio and where RK;t is the portfolio return for risky
capital given in (3).13 Note that this calculation explicitly assumes that corporate debt in
the model is exogenous, and held in xed proportion to the value of the rm. (There is no
nancing decision.) For the results reported below, we set B=E = 2=3 to match aggregate
debt-equity ratios computed in Benninga and Protopapadakis (1990).
Euler equation for the risky asset return is satised. These results also imply that the equilibrium allocations
of such economies are the same as the allocations obtained in otherwise identical economies with static
rms that rent capital from households on a period-by-period basis. Although these conclusions have been
formally proven only in an environment without adjustment costs, the magnitude of adjustment costs in our
economy is calibrated to be very small, amounting to less than one percent of investment per year.
13The cost of capital RK is a portfolio weighted average of the return on debt Rf and the return on equity
Re: RK = aRf + (1  a)Re, where a  BB+E :
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3.8 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened as a set of prices (bond prices, wages, risky asset returns, house
price, and land price) given by time-invariant functions qt = q (t; Zt), Wt = W (t; Zt) ;
RK;t = RK (t; Zt), p
H
t = p
H (t; Zt) ; and p
L
t = p
L
t (t; Zt) ; respectively, a set of cohort-
specic value functions and decision rules for each individual i,

Va; H
i
a+1;t+1; 
i
a+1;t+1B
i
a+1;t+1
	A
a=1
and a law of motion for ; t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1) such that:
1. Households optimize:
a(t; Zt; Z
i
a;t;W
i
a;t; H
i
a;t) = max
Hia+1;t+1;
i
a+1;t+1B
i
a+1;t+1
fU(Cia;t; H ia;t) (16)
+a+1jaEt[Va+1(t+1; Zt+1; Z
i
a;t+1;W
i
a+1;t+1; H
i
a+1;t+1)]g
subject to (6), (7), (8), and (9) if the individual of working age, and subject to (7)
and the analogous versions of (6), (8), and (9) (using pension income in place of wage
income), if the individual is retired.
2. Firms maximize value: VC;t solves (1), VH;t solves (2).
3. The land/permits price pLt satises p
L
t = (1  ) pHt ZH;tL t
 
KH;tN
 
H;t

:
4. The land/permits market clears: L = Lt:
5. Wages Wt =W (t; Zt) satisfy
Wt = (1  )ZC;tKC;tN C;t (17)
Wt = (1  ) (1  ) pHt ZH;tLtK(1 )H;t N (1 ) H;t : (18)
6. The housing market clears: pHt = p
H (t; Zt) is such that
YH;t =
Z
S
 
H ia;t+1  H ia;t (1  H)

d: (19)
7. The bond market clears: qt = q (t; Zt) is such thatZ
S
Bia;td+BF;t = 0: (20)
8. The risky asset market clears: RK;t = RK (t; Zt) is such that
1 =
Z
S
ia;td: (21)
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9. The labor market clears:
Nt  NC;t +NH;t =
Z
S
Lia;td: (22)
10. The social security tax rate is set so that total taxes equal total retirement benets:
NtWt =
Z
S
PEia;td; (23)
11. Government revenue from land/permit rentals equals total government spending, Gt:
pLt Lt = Gt
12. The presumed law of motion for the state space t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1) is consistent
with individual behavior.
Equations (17), (18) and (22) determine the NC;t and therefore determine the allocation
of labor across sectors:
(1  )ZC;tKC;tN C;t = (1  ) (1  ) pHt ZH;tLtK(1 )H;t (Nt  NC;t) (1 )  : (24)
Also, the aggregate resource constraint for the economy must take into account the hous-
ing and risky capital market transactions/participation costs and the wasteful government
spending, which reduce consumption, the adjustment costs in productive capital, which re-
duce rm prots, and the change in net foreign capital in the bond market, which nances
domestic consumption and investment. Thus, non-housing output equals non-housing con-
sumption (inclusive of costs Ft) plus government spending plus aggregate investment (gross
of adjustment costs) less the net change in the value of foreign holdings:
YC;t = Ct + Ft +Gt +

IC;t + C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t

+

IH;t + H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t

(25)
   BFt+1q (t; Zt) BFt | {z }
trade balance
;
where Ct and Ft are aggregate quantities dened as14
Ct 
Z
S
Cia;td Ft 
Z
S
F it d: (26)
14Note that (25) simply results from aggregating the budget constraints across all households, imposing
all market clearing conditions, and using the denitions of dividends as equal to rm revenue minus costs.
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The term labeled trade balanceis equal to the current account less net nancial income
from abroad, i.e., current account = trade balance   BFt+1
q(t;Zt)
: Note that debt service is
BFt+1
q(t;Zt)
.
To solve the model, it is necessary to approximate the innite dimensional object  with a
nite dimensional object. The appendix explains the solution procedure and how we specify a
nite dimensional vector to represent the law of motion for : The resulting approximation,
or bounded rationality equilibrium has been used extensively in the literature to solve
incomplete markets models (see the appendix for further discussion).
3.9 Welfare Measure
To quantify the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent foreign holdings regimes, we use a consumption
equivalent variation measure. To explain this measure, it is necessary to introduce some
additional notation. Let Ht denote aggregate housing wealth, i.e., Ht 
R
S H
i
a;td, and
analogously for other individual variables. To study a growing economy, it will be convenient
to normalize trending variables by trend output and denote their deterministically detrended
values in lower case, e.g., zc;t  Zc;t exp ( gt), hit  H it exp ( gt), etc. The solved policy
functions and state variables are expressed in terms of normalized variables.
Recall that the aggregate state of the economy is a pair, (Zt; t) ; where Zt  (zC;t; zH;t; bF;t; bF;t+1)0
denotes the exogenous aggregate states and t is a measure dened over
S =(AZ  H) :
As explained in the appendix, the bounded rationality equilibrium is computed by approxi-
mating the innite dimensional object (Zt; t) with a nite dimensional vector of aggregate
state variables. Let the subset of aggregate state variables excluding foreign bonds be ap-
proximated by AGt :
(zC;t; zH;t; t)  AGt =

zC;t; zH;t; kC;t;
kC;t
kC;t + kH;t
; ht; p
H
t ; qt

:
We may write the household value function as a function of detrended variables as
a(
AG
t ; bF;t; bF;t+1; Z
i
t ; w
i
t; h
i
t):
Integrating out aggregate risk except foreign bonds we have
a(bF;t; bF;t+1; Z
i
t ; w
i
t; h
i
t) =
Z
a(
AG
t ; bF;t; bF;t+1; Z
i
t ; w
i
t; h
i
t)d
AG
t :
We quantify the welfare consequences of di¤erent foreign capital states by computing
the increment to lifetime utility, (the household value function) in units of the composite
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(housing plus nonhousing) consumption good, of being in a high versus low state of foreign
capital holdings relative to trend GDP. We call this a consumption equivalent variation
(EV) measure. For example, we can compute the equivalent variation measure for individual
i of age a that would result from transitioning into a di¤erent foreign capital state at t + 1
by an increment , compared to remaining in a particular foreign capital state bF;t+1 = bF;t:
EVi;a =

a(bF;t; bF;t +; Z
i
t ; w
i
t; h
i
t)
a(bF;t; bF;t; Zit ; w
i
t; h
i
t)
 
 1
  1: (27)
The equivalent variation measure tells us how much this individuals lifetime composite
consumption must be increased so that her lifetime utility from remaining in a particular
foreign capital state bF;t equals that from transitioning to bF;t +. (We multiply the units
by 100 so as to express them in percent.) Positive numbers therefore reect a welfare gain
from transitioning, whereas negative numbers reect a welfare loss.
We use a similar criterion to compute an ex-ante welfare measure under the veil of
ignorance.That is, we compute the welfare implications of a change in foreign holdings for
an agent about to be born (age = 0) with no nancial wealth and the average (across agents
and over time) idiosyncratic productivity, Zit = 1. This is computed using that agents value
function at the start of life, which takes incorporates the agents expectation of lifetime
utility over all possible aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in the future, i.e.,
EVNB =

1(bF;t; bF;t +; 1; 0; h0)
1(bF;t; bF;t; 1; 0; h0)
 
 1
  1; (28)
where all individuals start life with zero nancial wealth and the same, very small, amount,
h0, of housing wealth.15
Finally, we compare the welfare consequences for more aggregated demographic groups
in a similar manner, integrating over EV across such groups. For example, we may compute
the welfare consequences for young households (age less than 35) as
EVi;a35 =
Z
a35

a(bF;t; bF;t +; Z
i
t ; w
i
t; h
i
t)
a(bF;t; bF;t; Zit ; w
i
t; h
i
t)
 
 1
da  1:
We form analogous measures for other age groups and for groups distinguished by wealth
and income.
Note that the welfare measures above take the average of the ratio of the value functions.
An alternative would be to take the ratio of the average. In practice the latter approach is
15Housing wealth cannot be zero or utility is innite. Therefore, all individuals are assumed to start life
with the amount of housing equal to the lowest point on the housing grid.
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a problem because the ratio of averages is highly sensitive to a few outliers in the wealth
distribution, usually one extremely poor household. In this case, that households utility
dominates the average utility and the welfare comparison becomes a comparison of tails of
the wealth distribution.
The integrals are computed as averages from a very long simulated sample path. We
locate all dates in this path for which bF;t is equal to a particular value eb, and for which
bF;t+1 is equal to eb+, and then locate all dates in which bF;t = bF;t+1 = eb:16 We then form
the ratio a(eb;eb + ; Zit ; wit; hit)=a(eb;eb; Zit ; wit; hit) and average this ratio over the relevant
subgroup of the population. We set the increment, , equal to a typical increase or decrease
in foreign holdings given the stochastic process (10), i.e.,  = (1  F ) b + F bF;t + F  1
(increase) or  = (1  F ) b+ F bF;t + F  ( 1) (decrease).
3.10 Model Calibration
The models parameters and their numerical calibration are reported in Table 1. A detailed
explanation of this calibration is given in the Appendix. The technology shocks ZC and ZH
are assumed to follow two-state independent Markov chains; the calibration is described in
the Appendix. The Appendix also describes our calibration of the individual productivity
shocks. Both the numerical grid and the parameters of the AR(1) process for bF;t+1 (10)
are calibrated from historical data on foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury debt spanning the
period 1984 to 2010. A detailed explanation is given in the Appendix. This leads to values
for b = 0:95, b = 0:148, and b = 0:0171.
4 Results
This section presents the models main implications. Unless otherwise noted, these implica-
tions are based on long simulations of the model using the solved optimal policy functions
and evolution equations for the state variables. Before turning to the welfare implications
of changes in foreign holdings, we present the models predictions for a set of benchmark
business cycle statistics and asset pricing statistics.
16In practice, this is accomplished by locating all points within a close radius of a particular value.
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4.1 Business Cycle Moments
Table 2 presents benchmark results for Hodrick-Prescott (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)) de-
trended aggregate quantities. Panel A presents business cycle moments from U.S. annual
data over the period 1953 to 2010. Panel B presents simulated data from the model. We re-
port statistics for total output, orGDP  Y = YC+pHYH+CH , for non-housing consumption
(inclusive of expenditures on nancial services), equal to Ct + Ft, for housing consumption
CH;t, dened as price per unit of housing services times quantity of housing or CH;t  RtHt,
for total (housing and non-housing) consumption CT;t = Ct + Ft + CH;t, for non-housing
investment (inclusive of adjustment costs) It = (IC;t + C ()KC;t) + (IH;t + H ()KH;t), for
residential investment, pHt YH;t, and for total investment IT;t = It + p
H
t YH;t.
The standard deviation of total aggregate consumption divided by the standard deviation
of GDP is 0.77 in the model, close to the 0.74 value found in the data. In addition, the level of
GDP volatility in the model is close to that in the data. Thus the model produces a plausible
amount of aggregate consumption volatility. Total investment is more volatile than output,
both in the model and in the data, and the model produces about the right amount of relative
volatility: the ratio of the standard deviation of total investment to that of GDP is 3.2 in
the model compared to 3.5 in the data. The model does a good job of matching the relative
volatility of residential investment to output: in the data the ratio of these volatilities is 5.6,
while it is 4.9 in the model. Finally, both in the model and the data, residential investment is
less correlated with output than is consumption and total investment. The model somewhat
understates the share of consumption in GDP.
To get a sense of the how aggregate business cycle statistics are a¤ected by the quantities
of foreign holdings of domestic assets, as well as by a capital inow (outow), Table 3 presents
the mean and standard deviation of the (detrended) aggregate variables, conditional on the
level (stock) of foreign holdings as of last period, bF;t (external leverage), as well as on the
change (ow) in foreign holdings this period, bF;t+1. The statistics are reported conditional
on being in the top or bottom half of the sample in terms of these variables, distinguished
as high, Hor low, Lin Table 3.
A capital inow, which represents a negative trade balance or a current account decit,
nances domestic spending and therefore acts like a positive economic shock. Table 3 shows
that a high capital inow stimulates investment and consumption: the means of these vari-
ables are higher when capital inows are high than when inows are low. On the other hand,
a high stock of external leverage, bF;t, has little impact on consumption and investment. The
stimulatory a¤ect of past inows is dampened by the expectation that the debt must eventu-
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ally be repaid, as capital ows relative to GDP slowly mean-revert. A high capital inow also
makes consumption more volatile but investment less volatile, relative to low capital inow
states. This occurs because foreign purchases of the riskless bond crowd domestic savers
out of the safe bond market, reducing the availability of one of the assets used to insure
against aggregate risk. The result is a rise in aggregate consumption volatility. Investment
volatility, on the other hand, falls because a high inow simultaneously leads to a higher
level of investment. With convex adjustment costs, the volatility of investment is reduced
because the cost of any given change in investment is higher when the level of investment is
high.
How do the stock and ow in external leverage a¤ect growth rates of aggregate variables?
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the log di¤erence in aggregate variables to both the level of
external holdings last period, bF;t, and the capital ow bF;t, from a multivariate regression
on these variables. A capital inowbF;t+1 stimulates higher economic growth (consumption,
investment and GDP), and higher growth in the capital stocks at the beginning of next period
(housing and physical capital). The marginal e¤ect of a high capital inow also raises the
real wage (row 10), since the inux of foreign funds stimulates growth in the capital stock
and, along with it, the value of the relatively scarce factor (labor). Once one controls for the
stimulatory impact of a higher capital inow, however, a high level of external debt has a
small contractionary e¤ect on spending (consumption and investment) and GDP, since the
higher debt must eventually be repaid. In contrast to the e¤ects of a capital inow, however,
the a¤ects of these changes in the stock of external debt on investment are too small to have
a discernable inuence on the slow-moving physical and housing capital stocks.
4.2 Asset Pricing Implications of International Capital Flows
Table 5 reports the models implications for asset pricing moments. The table reports un-
conditional moments in the allcolumn, as well as moments conditional on either the stock
of foreign holdings last period, bF;t, or on the ow this period, bF;t+1: These conditional
moments are calculated conditional on the observation being in either the top or bottom half
of the sample in terms of bF;t or bF;t+1. The Sharpe ratio for each asset, denoted SR [] ; is
dened to be the mean of the return on the asset in excess of the risk-free rate, divided by
the standard deviation of this excess return.
The benchmark model matches the historical mean return for the risk-free rate but some-
what overstates the volatility of the risk-free rate. The model produces a sizable equity return
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of about 6% per annum (an annual equity premium of 4.5%) and an annual Sharpe ratio
of 0.51. Two factors related to the cyclicality of the cross-sectional distribution of con-
sumption contribute to the models high average risk premium and Sharpe ratio. First,
idiosyncratic income risk is countercyclical. Second, house prices and therefore collateral
values are procyclical, making borrowing constraints countercyclical. These factors mean
that insurance/risk-sharing opportunities are reduced precisely when households need them
most (in recessions) resulting in a high risk premium and Sharpe ratio.
One shortcoming of the present setup is that the volatility of the equity return is just
a bit more than half of what it is in post-war data. This reects a well known trade-o¤ in
production-based models with adjustment costs between matching the volatility of invest-
ment and the volatility of equity returns. Higher adjustment costs lead to a more volatile
equity return but less volatile investment. One potential resolution is to increase adjustment
costs while at the same time introducing additional shocks to o¤set the reduction in the
volatility of investment, such as e.g., stochastic depreciation in capital, as in Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008), or investment-specic tech-
nology shocks. We do not pursue these possibilities here in order to keep the complexity of
the model to a minimum and the numerical solution procedure manageable.
For housing assets, Table 5 shows that the model produces about the right mean return
and excess return for the aggregate house price index. The mean excess housing return is
9.72% on an annual basis, with Sharpe ratio equal to 1.81, .comparable to U.S. data for
aggregate house price indexes. It is important to note that the housing Sharpe ratio as
dened here, both in the model and the data, is not a Sharpe ratio for an individual house.
Thus it is not the Sharpe ratio of a feasible trading strategy, since it pertains to an aggregate
house index return. Individual houses are subject to signicant idiosyncratic risk that is
averaged out in the aggregate index. It follows that the standard deviation of the aggregate
housing return is much lower, and its Sharpe ratio much higher, than the corresponding
gures for a typical individual home.
The right-most four columns of Table 5 show asset pricing moments conditional on the
amount of external leverage, bF;t, or conditional on high or low capital inows, bF;t+1. A
high capital inow leads to a sharp decline in the riskless interest rate and in the expected
returns on equity and housing. At the same time, however, a capital inow leads to an
increase in equity and housing risk premia and Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe ratio on equity
is 42% higher in high capital inow states than in low capital inow states. Risk premia
rise because the inow reduces the e¤ective supply of the safe asset, forcing domestic savers
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to hold more of their funds in the form of risky securities. Thus, although total expected
returns (discount rates) fall in response to a capital inow, the risk-premium component
of the discount rate rises. The rise in risk premia in turn partially (but not fully) o¤sets
the stimulatory impact of a lower riskless interest rate on home prices, a result previously
emphasized in FLVN, partly explaining why there is only a modest increase in the price-
rent ratio in response to a capital inow (row 13). (The aggregate home price increase is
also limited by the equilibrium increase in residential investment, as discussed below.) Row
6 shows that a capital inow reduces the volatility of stock returns because, as discussed
above, both the level of investment and therefore the adjustment costs are higher in those
states, and the volatility of investment lower. Since both investment and the stock price are
linked through the marginal value of an additional unit of capital (marginal q), stock return
volatility falls along with investment volatility.
In contrast to the modest impact a foreign capital inow has on the price-rent ratio,
row 14 of Table 4 shows that the stock price-dividend ratio responds sharply to a capital
inow and is 44% higher than average, conditional on a capital inow, and the same amount
lower conditional on a capital outow. This occurs because a capital inow is met with
a signicant increase in expected dividend growth that is not present for expected rent
growth. Indeed, as emphasized in FLVN, positive economic shocks are associated with an
expectation of lower future rental growth because they stimulate residential investment.17
As residential investment expands, the cost of future housing services (rent) is expected to
be lower, rather than higher, an e¤ect that, by itself, would reduce the price-rent ratio. This
isnt the only e¤ect, however, and on balance the price-rent ratio still rises in response to
a capital inow because the decline in discount rates more than o¤sets the expected fall in
future rent growth.18
Taken together, these elements of the model imply that a reserve-driven capital inow
of the type that occurred in the last 15 years can have, at most, a limited impact on home
prices. This is evident from row 13 of Table 4, which shows that high capital inow states
17Rents are inversely related to the housing stock because the implicit rental price for housing services
is positively related the marginal utility of housing services relative to the marginal utility of non-housing
services. Thus an expansion of the housing stock reduces the expected growth rate of future rents. By
contrast, expected future prots of the productive sector are positively related to an expansion of the physical
capital stock because the resulting increase in the marginal product of labor more than o¤sets the marginal
cost of new investment.
18Predictable variation in housing returns must therefore account for more than 100 percent of the vari-
ability in price-rent ratios.
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lead to a relatively small (on the order of 2.4%) increase in the price-rent ratio relative to
the average across all states. This outcome occurs because both the rise in risk premia and
the decline in expected future rent growth that accompany an inow drag the price-rent
ratio down at the same time as the lower riskless rate pushes it up. In the absence of these
endogenous changes in risk premia and expected rent growth (as occurs, for example, in
partial equilibrium analyses), a decline in the riskless interest rate on the order of magnitude
generated by high versus low capital inows (column 7 versus column 8, row 1) would lead
to a very substantial increase in the price-rent ratio. The contrary nding here, namely that
a large, reserve-driven decline in interest rates generates a relatively small increase in house
prices, underscores the importance of general equilibrium considerations in the analysis of
global capital markets.19
Table 5 (columns 5 and 6) also shows that a high level of external leverage, bF;t, raises
both the risk premium on equity and housing and the volatility of these assets, as domestic
households on the whole are now in a more levered portfolio position. This outcome is the
same as that in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) (CK), who study a two-asset (equity
and risk-free rate) representative agent exchange economy in which foreign demand for the
safe asset is perfectly correlated with (but less volatile than), domestic consumption. That
model, like this one, implies that high external leverage increase the equity risk premium.
But unlike here, in their model a capital inow (an increase in external leverage) lowers
risk premia. The reasons for this di¤erence are three-fold. First, capital ows in CK are
assumed to be more stable than domestic cash ows, which lowers risk premia by stabilizing
the economy. Here, capital ows are independent of the aggregate state and have innovations
that are about as volatile as GDP. Second, unlike CK, international capital ows are not
perfectly correlated with domestic cash ows; they therefore add systematic risk to the
economy, uncorrelated with the aggregate risk already there. Third, CK solve their model in
continuous time, so that the instantaneous e¤ect of a capital inow has a negligible e¤ect on
leverage. By contrast, in the discrete time setting here, capital inows have an immediate
e¤ect on external leverage. Capital inows here therefore inuence the economy in much
the same way that CKs level of external leverage does, which in their model becomes the
dominant driver of the risk premium over time.
19It follows that other factors must be primarily responsible for the large boom-bust cycle in home prices
that occurred from 2000-2010. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) argue that plausibly
calibrated changes in collateral requirements and housing transactions costs over this period can account for
the run-up and subsequent decline in U.S. aggregate house price-rent ratios.
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Finally, we investigate how international capital ows a¤ect the growth rates of asset
values, returning to Table 4. The last two rows of Table 4 show the sensitivity of the log
di¤erence in the value of the risky mutual fund formed from ownership claims to the two
productive sectors (denoted Vt  VC;t + VH;t), as well as housing wealth, pHt Ht+1; to both
the level of external holdings last period, bF;t, and the current capital ow bF;t+1, from a
multivariate regression on these variables. A capital inow stimulates the aggregate value
of the risky mutual fund as well as housing wealth, pHt Ht+1. But conditional on the inow,
the level of external nance depresses asset values as the nancing burden of higher external
debt takes its toll on domestic spending and ultimately on asset valuations.
4.3 Welfare Implications
With an understanding of how international capital ows are related in equilibrium to ag-
gregate quantities and asset prices, we now turn to their welfare e¤ects. The welfare conse-
quences, by age, of a capital inow or outow are displayed in Figure 4, quantied by the
EV measure discussed above. This equivalent variation measure tells us how much, in per-
cent, this individuals lifetime composite consumption must be increased so that her lifetime
utility from remaining in a particular foreign capital state bF;t equals that from transitioning
to bF;t + , where  is set to equal a typical change in foreign ows given our estimated
standard deviation of the stochastic process (10), i.e.,:  = (1  F ) b + F bF;t + F  1 (a
typical increase in foreign ows) or  = (1  F ) b+ F bF;t + F  ( 1) (a typical decrease).
Notice that  depends on the level of external debt brought in from last period, bF;t, as well
as on whether t = 1 or  1. Figure 4 shows the EV measure integrated out across all values
of bF;t (dashed lines), as well as conditional on the economy residing in particular quintiles
of bF;t (solid lines). The consequences of a capital inow are shown in the left panel and a
capital outow in the right panel.
Figure 4 shows that the welfare implications of a capital inow or outow are non-
monotone in age. A capital inow benets the young (age 35 or less), while an outow is
costly. The young benet from a capital inow due to lower interest rates, which reduce
the costs of home ownership and of borrowing in anticipation of higher expected future in-
come attributable to the hump-shaped life-cycle prole in earnings. In the lowest quintile of
external leverage, the youngest households require 1% more lifetime consumption to make
them as well o¤ as they would be from transitioning to a higher  > 0 level of external
leverage. Conversely, a capital outow hurts the young; in the highest quintile of external
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leverage, the youngest households would be willing to give up approximately 1.5% of lifetime
consumption in order to forgo transitioning to a lower  < 0 level of external leverage.
Figure 4 shows that middle-aged savers (age 45 to 75) are hurt by a capital inow.
This occurs for two reasons. First, they are crowded out of the safe bond market and
exposed to greater systematic risk in equity and housing markets. Although they are partially
compensated for this in equilibrium by higher risk-premia, they still su¤er from a second
e¤ect of an inow: lower expected rates of return on all assets, the riskless bond, equity, and
housing. The net e¤ect of these two means that middle-aged savers experience a welfare loss
from an inow and, conversely, a welfare gain from a capital outow.
Older retired individuals, on the other hand, are far less hurt by either lower expected
rates of return or by greater exposure to systematic risk. This is because they have fewer
years to go until the end of life and are in a dissaving stage of the life-cycle. Moreover, because
retirees earn a pension that is in large part determined by their earnings in the last period
of working life, even those with considerable housing and equity wealth are less exposed to
systematic risk than are individuals of working age, whose labor earnings vary not only with
the current aggregate state but also with the countercyclical uctuation in the variance of
idiosyncratic earnings surprisessee (4).20 Taken together, these factors imply that older
households experience a signicant net gain from even modest increases in asset values that
accompany a capital inow. Conversely, from the highest external leverage quintile, the
oldest individuals would be willing to forgo up to 1.6% of lifetime consumption to avoid a
capital outow and the resulting drop in asset prices.
How do the welfare implications vary by income and net worth? Figure 5 decomposes
the welfare costs of a capital outow by age, income and wealth. Signicant heterogeneity
by income and wealth is exhibited for young and old individuals, but not for the middle-
aged. Young individuals who are high-income or wealthy su¤er less from a capital outow
than low-income or poor households because they are better equipped to self-insure against
idiosyncratic and aggregate risks without the benet of easier borrowing terms that foreign
capital provides. Less a­ uent households must rely more on external nance in order to
avoid bumping up against collateral constraints; they are therefore hurt more when external
nance declines. For older individuals, the story is di¤erent. High net worth retirees su¤er
more than low net worth retirees, because they have the most to lose from an outow, namely
20Pension (Social Security) income is not entirely insulated from aggregate risk, since the pay-as-you-go
system depends on tax revenue, which in turn depends on the current wage. But it is still far less sensitive
to the current aggregate state than is labor income.
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a decline in the value of their assets. The same pattern occurs when comparing high versus
low income retirees because income and net worth are positively correlated.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the welfare costs of a capital outow under the veil of igno-
ranceto agents just being born, as computed using (28). The measure compares the value
function of a newborn, born into the fth quintile of todays foreign holdings, bF;t+1 = b5;t+1;
with the value function of a newborn born into each of the other quintiles, bF;t+1 = b1;t+1;
b2;t+1;...; b4;t+1, for various levels of last periods holdings bF;t. The comparison is between two
newborns with the same initial nancial wealth (zero), the same initial housing wealth, and
the average (across agents and over time) idiosyncratic productivity draw, Zit = 1. Figure
6 shows that newborns born into high capital inow states are better o¤ than those born
into low capital inow states. The expected welfare losses from the outow that will occur
when they are middle-aged savers are more than o¤set by the expected benets when they
are young and elderly. The largest di¤erences in welfare, quantitatively, come from compar-
ing an individual born into the fth quintile with one born into the rst quintile of current
foreign holdings: the individual born into the fth quintile would be willing to forgo up to
1% of lifetime consumption in order to avoid being born into the rst quintile.
5 Conclusion
The last two decades have been marked by a steady rise in international ownership of U.S.
assets considered to be safe stores-of-value. Some have argued that these trends are optimal
or benign, and/or that countries like the United States ultimately benet from easier bor-
rowing terms (e.g., Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2005), Cooper (2007), Mendoza,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007), Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008a)). Others (some-
times at the same time) have warned of the hazards of ever-increasing external leverage, and
of the greater systematic risk that accompanies it (Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008a),
Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008b), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2009), Fahri, Gourinchas,
and Rey (2011)). Missing from this analysis are general equilibrium models of aggregate and
idiosyncratic risks, plausible nancial markets, and household heterogeneity with which to
study the welfare consequences of these global capital ows.
In this paper, we turn to such a general equilibrium theory in order better our under-
standing of the distributional consequences of this brand of international capital ow. We
nd that these ows confer on U.S. households both costs and benets, both greater risk and
greater opportunities to insure against risk, and that they do so concurrently. The relevant
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question is, which households are privy to the benets and which are subject to the costs?
The model we study implies that foreign governmental demand for U.S. safe assets does
lead to easier borrowing terms in the U.S., which benets young households who are in a
borrowing stage of the life-cycle. It also benets the wealthy old, both because they gain
from the rise in asset values that accompanies a capital inow, and because they have the
least to lose from lower expected rates of return and from the greater exposure of domestic
saving to systematic risk. On the other hand, such ows are costly for the middle-aged, who
nd their retirement savings earning lower expected rates of return on portfolios increasingly
tilted towards assets with greater systematic risk. This phenomenon is reected in a sharp
rise in the equilibrium risk premium on equity and housing assets, and in a decline in the
lifetime utility of households saving for retirement.
It is commonly believed that a large inux of international capital (on the order of
magnitude experienced in the U.S. over the last 15 years) must play an important role in
domestic home price appreciation. If so, one might expect that middle-aged savers who own
homes would be likely to gain, rather than lose, from a capital inow. This reasoning ignores
the general equilibrium response of both residential investment and risk-premia to a capital
inow. A capital inow acts like a positive economic shock, provoking a rise in residential
investment, thereby reducing the expected growth rate of the dividend that housing pays. At
the same time, a capital inow causes an increase in the housing risk premium, implying that
discount rates fall far less than the decline in the risk-free rate alone. Both of these factors
work to o¤set the stimulatory impact of a capital inow-driven decline in interest rates on
home prices, thereby limiting a potential source of welfare gains to middle-aged homeowners.
Of course, these same factors limit house price appreciation for all homeowners, including
older homeowners who ultimately benet from the capital inow. The di¤erence is that
older households dont bear as much systematic risk in their retirement earnings as workers
do in their labor earnings, and they su¤er far less than those still accumulating wealth for
retirement from lower expected rates of return.
In closing, we note that purchases of long-term Treasuries by the U.S. Federal Reserve,
such as those that occurred in 2010 and 2011 in their so-called quantitative easing QE2
initiatives, are likely to have e¤ects that are similar to those resulting from purchases of these
same securities by foreign governmental holders. Importantly, the Federal Reserves demand
for U.S. Treasuries, like those of foreign governmental holders, is likely to be extremely
price inelastic as it pursues specic monetary policy goals that do not play a role in private
demand for such securities. A complete analysis of the distributional consequences of these
29
and related policy programs is an important topic for future study.
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6 Appendix
This appendix describes how we calibrate the stochastic shock processes in the model, de-
scribes the historical data we use to measure house price-rent ratios and returns, and de-
scribes our numerical solution strategy.
6.1 Calibration of Stochastic Process for bF;t
Individuals in the model form beliefs about the evolution of the stochastic process for foreign
holdings relative to trend GDP, bF;t = BF;t=Y t. We assume these beliefs take the form given
in (10) and calibrate parameters of this process from U.S. data. In the data, Y t is trend GDP
as computed from a Hodrick-Prescott lter (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)). The historical
data on BF;t consist of 13 observations between December 1984 and June 2010, irregularly
spaced, on foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury debt (T-bonds and T-notes). The source for
these data is Department of the Treasury, Treasury International Capital System division.
The numerical grid is set to match the span of observations on bF;t. We obtain an annual time
series from the raw data by tting a Hermite polynomial through the raw data, respecting
the exact date of each observation. This delivers a time series of 27 annual observations
from 1984 until 2010. An AR(1) is then estimated through these observations. This leads to
the parameter combination, F = 0:968, b = 0:1475, and F = 0:0171: We use a value for
the persistence parameter, F = 0:95; that is slightly lower than the point estimate since it
delivers more stable numerical results. The innovation t+1 is assumed to take on two values
with equal probability:  = [1; 1] :
Calibration of Shocks
The aggregate technology shock processes ZC and ZH are calibrated following a two-state
Markov chain, with two possible values for each shock, fZC = ZCl; ZC = ZChg ;
fZH = ZHl; ZH = ZHhg ; implying four possible combinations:
ZC = ZCl; ZH = ZHl
ZC = ZCh; ZH = ZHl
ZC = ZCl; ZH = ZHh
ZC = ZCh; ZH = ZHh:
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Each shock is modeled as,
ZCl = 1  eC ; ZCh = 1 + eC
ZHl = 1  eH ; ZCh = 1 + eH ;
where eC and eH are calibrated to match the volatilities of GDP and residential investment
in the data.
We assume that ZC and ZH are independent of one another. Let PC be the transition
matrix for ZC and PH be the transition matrix for ZH . The full transition matrix equals
P =
"
pHll P
C pHlhP
C
pHhlP
C pHhhP
C
#
;
where
PH =
"
pHll p
H
lh
pHhl p
H
hh
#
=
"
pHll 1  pHll
1  pHhh pHhh
#
;
and where we assume PC ; dened analogously, equals PH . We calibrate values for the
matrices as
PC =
"
:60 :40
:25 :75
#
PH =
"
:60 :40
:25 :75
#
=>
P =
266664
:36 :24 :24 :16
:15 :45 :10 :30
:15 :10 :45 :30
:0625 :1875 :1875 :5625
377775 :
With these parameter values, we match the average length of expansions divided by the
average length of recessions (equal to 5.7 in NBER data from over the period 1945-2001).
We dene a recession as the event fZCl;; ZHl;g ; so that the probability of staying in a recession
is pHll p
C
ll = 0:36; implying that a recession persists on average for 1= (1  :36) = 1:56 years.
We dene an expansion as either the event fZCh;ZHl;g or fZCl; ZHhg or fZCh;ZHh;g : Thus,
there are four possible states (one recession, three expansion). The average amount of time
spent in each state is given by the stationary distribution (4 1) vector , where
P = :
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That is,  is the eigenvector for P with corresponding eigenvalue equal to 1. The rst
element of , denoted 1; multiplies the probabilities in P for transitioning to any of the
four states tomorrow conditional on being in a recession state today. 1 therefore gives the
average amount of time spent in the recession state, while 2; 3; and 4 give the average
amount of time spent in the other three (expansion) states. Given the matrix P above, the
solution for  is
 =
0BBBB@
0:1479
0:2367
0:2367
0:3787
1CCCCA :
This implies the chain spends 14.79% of the time in a recession state and 85.21% of the
time in expansion states, so the average length of expansions relative to that of recessions is
85:21= (14:79) = 5:76 years.
Idiosyncratic income shocks follow the rst order Markov process ln
 
Zia;t

= ln
 
Zia 1;t 1

+
ia;t: We directly calibrate the specication in levels:
Zia;t = Z
i
a;t 1
 
1 + Eia;t

;
where Eia;t takes on one of two values in each aggregate state:
Eia;t =
(
E with Pr = 0:5
 E with Pr = 0:5
; if ZC;t  E (ZC;t)
Eia;t =
(
R with Pr = 0:5
 R with Pr = 0:5
; if ZC;t < E (ZC;t)
R > E:
Thus, E
 
Zia;t=Z
i
a;t 1

= 1:
6.2 Calibration of Parameters
Parameters pertaining to the rmsdecisions are set as follows. The capital depreciation
rate, , is set to 0.12, which corresponds to the average Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
depreciation rates for equipment and structures. The housing depreciation rate H , is set to
0.025 following Tuzel (2009). Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985),
the capital share for the non-housing sector is set to  = 0:36: For the residential investment
sector, the value of the capital share in production is taken from a BEA study of gross product
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originating, by industry. The study nds that the capital share in the construction sector
ranges from 29.4% and 31.0% over the period 1992-1996. We therefore set the capital share in
the housing sector to  = 0:30.21 The adjustment costs for capital in both sectors are assumed
to be the same quadratic function of the investment to capital-ratio, '
 
I
K
  2, where the
constant ' is chosen to represent a tradeo¤between the desire to match aggregate investment
volatility simultaneously with the volatility of asset returns. Under this calibration, rms
pay a cost only for net new investment; there is no cost to replace depreciated capital. This
implies that the total adjustment cost '
 
I
K
  2Kt under our calibration is quite small: on
average less than one percent of investment, It. The xed quantity of land/permits available
each period, L, is set to a level that permits the model to approximately match the housing
investment-GDP ratio. In post-war data this ratio is 6%; under our calibration of L, the
ratio ranges from 5% to 6.2%. The share of land/permits in the housing production function
is set to 10%, to match estimates in Davis and Heathcote (2005), requiring  = 0:9.
Parameters of the individuals problem are set as follows. The subjective time discount
factor is set to  = 0:923 at annual frequency, to allow the model to match the mean of a
short-term Treasury rate in the data. The survival probability a+1ja = 1 for a+1  65. For
a+1 > 65, we set a+1ja equal to the fraction of households over 65 born in a particular year
alive at age a+ 1; as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau. From these numbers, we obtain
the stationary age distribution in the model, and use it to match the average earnings over
the life-cycle, Ga, to that observed from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Risk aversion
is set to  = 8; to help the models match the high Sharpe ratio for equity observed in the
data. The static elasticity of substitution between C and H is set to " = 1 (Cobb-Douglas
utility), following evidence in Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2010) that expenditure shares on
housing are approximately constant over time and across U.S. metropolitan statistical areas.
The weight,  on C in the utility function is set to 0.70, corresponding to a housing ex-
penditure share of 0.30. The regime-switching conditional variance in the unit root process
in idiosyncratic earnings is calibrated following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) to
match their estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. These are E = 0:0768;
and R = 0:1296:
21From the November 1997 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Gross Prod-
uct by Industry, 194796, by Sherlene K.S. Lum and Robert E. Yuskavage.
http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/national/1197gpo/maintext.htm
Gross Product Originating is equal to gross domestic income, whose components can be grouped into
categories that approximate shares of labor and capital. Under a Cobb-Douglas production function, these
equal shares of capital and labor in output.
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To calibrate the costs of equity market participation we follow results in Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), who nds support for the presence of a xed, per period participation cost, but not
for the hypothesis of variable costs. She estimates the size of these costs and nds that
they are small, less than 50 dollars per year in year 2000 dollars. These ndings motivate
our calibration of these costs so that they are no greater than 1% of per capita, average
consumption, denoted C
i
in Table 1.
We set the maximum combined LTV (rst and second mortgages) to be 85%, correspond-
ing to $ = 15%: It should be emphasized that 1   $ gives the maximum combined (rst
and second mortgage) LTV ratio. This will di¤er from the average LTV ratio because not
everyone borrows up to the credit limit.
The xed and variable housing transactions costs for housing consumption are governed
by the parameters  0 and  1. These costs are more comprehensive than the costs of buying
and selling existing homes. They include costs of any change in housing consumption, such
as home improvements and additions, that may be associated with mortgage renancing and
home equity extraction, as well as non-pecuniary psychological costs. We set the values of
xed costs  0 and variable costs  1 to be half-way between the values specied in Model 1
and Model 3 in Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009). The Model 1 parameter
values in that paper were intended to match a period prior to the housing boom of 2000-2006
and were anchored by matching the average number of years individuals in the model go
without changing housing consumption equal to the average length of residency (in years) for
home owners in the Survey of Consumer Finances across the 1989-2001 waves of the survey.
Model 3 values in that paper were reduced to match the evidence for a decline in housing
transactions costs during the housing boom of 2000-2006. Since 2006, anecdotal evidence
suggests that these costs have again risen, though not all the way up to their pre-boom
levels. This leaves us with a value for  0 that is approximately 2.7% of annual per capita
consumption, and a value for  1 that is approximately 4.3% of the value of the house p
H
t H
i
a;t.
Numerical Solution Procedure
The numerical solution strategy consists of solving the individuals problem taking as given
her beliefs about the evolution of the aggregate state variables. With this solution in hand,
the economy is simulated for many individuals and the simulation is used to compute the
equilibrium evolution of the aggregate state variables, given the assumed beliefs. If the
equilibrium evolution di¤ers from the beliefs individuals had about that evolution, a new
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set of beliefs are assumed and the process is repeated. Individualsexpectations are rational
once this process converges and individual beliefs coincide with the resulting equilibrium
evolution.
The state of the economy is a pair, (Zt; t) ; where t is a measure dened over
S =(AZ  H) ;
where A = f1; 2; :::Ag is the set of ages, where Z is the set of all possible idiosyncratic shocks,
where  is the set of all possible beginning-of-period nancial wealth realizations, and where
H is the set of all possible beginning-of-period housing wealth realizations. That is, t is a
distribution of agents across ages, idiosyncratic shocks, nancial, and housing wealth. Given
a nite dimensional vector to approximate t, and a vector of individual state variables
it = (z
i
t; w
i
t; h
i
t);
the individuals problem is solved using dynamic programming.
An important step in the numerical strategy is approximating the joint distribution of
individuals, t, with a nite dimensional object. The resulting approximation, or bounded
rationality equilibrium has been used elsewhere to solve overlapping generations models
with heterogenous agents and aggregate risk, including Krusell and Smith (1998); Ríos-Rull
and Sánchez-Marcos (2006); Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007); Gomes and Michaelides
(2008); Favilukis (2008), among others. For our application, we approximate this space with
a vector of aggregate state variables other than BF;t and BF;t+1 with (in detrended values)
AGt = (zC;t; zH;t; kt; St; ht; p
H
t ; qt);
where
Kt = KC;t +KH;t
and
St =
KC;t
KC;t +KH;t
:
The state variables are the observable aggregate technology shocks, the rst moment of the
aggregate capital stock, the share of aggregate capital used in production of the consumption
good, the aggregate stock of housing, and the relative house price and bond price, respec-
tively. The bond and the house price are natural state variables because the joint distribution
of all individuals only matters for the individuals problem in so far as it a¤ects asset prices.
Note that knowledge of Kt and St is tantamount to knowledge of KC;t and KH;t separately,
and vice versa (KC;t = KtSt; KH;t = Kt(1  St)).
36
To solve the model, all variables are divided by the trend component exp (gt) to obtain
policy functions and state variables have invariant distributions. In the simulations, we
recover the levels of the variables by multiplying them by exp (gt) and returns are multiplied
by (1 + g) :
Because of the large number of state variables and because the problem requires that
prices in two asset markets (housing and bond) must be determined by clearing markets every
period, the proposed problem is highly numerically intensive. To make the problem tractable,
we obviate the need to solve the dynamic programming problem of rms numerically by
instead solving analytically for a recursive solution to value function taking the form V (Kt) =
QtKt, where Qt (Tobins q) is a recursive function. We discuss this below.
In order to solve the individuals dynamic programming problem, the individual must
know AGt+1 and 
i
t+1 as a function of 
AG
t and 
i
t and aggregate shocks Zt+1 = (ZC;t; ZH;t; BF;t; BF;t+1).
Here we show that this can be achieved by specifying individualsbeliefs for the laws of mo-
tion of four quantities:
A1 Kt+1,
A2 pHt+1,
A3 qt+1, and
A4 [t+1t+1
t
(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)]; where QC;t+1  VC;t+1=KC;t+1 and analogously for QH;t+1.
Let t+1t+1
t
 Mt+1: The beliefs are approximated by a linear function of the aggregate
state variables as follows:
{t+1 = A(n) (Zt; Zt+1) e{t; (29)
where A(n) (Zt; Zt+1) is a 45 matrix that depends on the aggregate shocks Zt; and Zt+1and
where
{t+1 

Kt+1; p
H
t+1; qt+1; [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)]
0
;e{t  Kt; pHt ; qt; St; Ht0 :
We initialize the law of motion (29) with a guess for the matrix A(n) (Zt; Zt+1), given by
A(0) (Zt; Zt+1) : The initial guess is updated in an iterative procedure (described below) to
insure that individualsbeliefs are consistent with the resulting equilibrium.
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Given (29), individuals can form expectations of AGt+1 and 
i
t+1 as a function of 
AG
t and
it and aggregate shocks Zt+1. To see this, we employ the following equilibrium relation (as
shown below) linking the investment-capital ratios of the two production sectors:
IH;t
KH;t
=
IC;t
KC;t
+
1
2'
Et [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)] : (30)
Moreover, note that Et [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)] can be computed from (29) by integrating
the 4th equation over the possible values of Zt+1 given e{t and Zt:
Equation (30) is derived by noting that the consumption rm solves a problem taking
the form
V (KC;t) = max
IC;t;NC;t
ZC;tK

CtN
1 
C;t   wtNC;t   IC;t   '

IC;t
KC;t
  
2
+ Et [Mt+1V (KC;t+1)] :
The rst-order condition for optimal labor choice implies NC;t =

ZC;t(1 )
wt
1=
KC;t: Substi-
tuting this expression into V (KC;t), the optimization problem may be written
V (KC;t) = max
It
XC;tKC;t   IC;t   '

IC;t
KC;t
  
2
KC;t + Et [Mt+1V (KC;t+1)](31)
s:t: KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t
where
XC;t  

ZC;t
wt
(1  )
(1 )=
ZC;t
is a function of aggregate variables over which the rm has no control.
The housing rms solves
V (KH;t) = max
IH;t;NH;t
pHt ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t
   wtNH;t   IH;t   pLt Lt
 '

IH;t
KH;t
  
2
+ Et [Mt+1V (KH;t+1)] : (32)
The rst-order conditions for optimal labor and land/permits choice for the housing rm
imply that NH;t = kNKH;t, Lt = kLKH;t; where
kN =

k1k
1 
2
1=
kL =

k
(1 )
1 k
1 (1 )
2
1=
k1 = p
H
t ZH;t (1  ) =wt
k2 = p
H
t ZH;t (1  ) =pLt :
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Substituting this expression into V (KH;t), the optimization problem may be written
V (KH;t) = max
It
XHtKH;t   IH;t   '

IH;t
KH;t
  
2
KH;t + Et [Mt+1V (KH;t+1)](33)
s:t: KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t + IH;t
where
XH;t = p
H
t ZH;tk
(1 )
N k
1 
L :
Let s index the sector as either consumption, C, or housing, H:We now guess and verify
that for each rm, V (Ks;t+1) ; for s = C;H takes the form
V (Ks;t+1) = Qs;t+1Ks;t+1; s = C;H (34)
where Qs;t+1 depends on aggregate state variables but is not a function of the rms capital
stock Ks;t+1 or investment Is;t. Plugging (34) into (31) we obtain
V (Ks;t) = max
It
Xs;tKs;t It '

Is;t
Ks;t
  
2
Ks;t+Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1] [(1  )Ks;t + Is;t] : (35)
The rst-order conditions for the maximization (35) imply
Is;t
Ks;t
=  +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
: (36)
Substituting (36) into (35) we verify that V (Ks;t) takes the form Qs;tKs;t:
V (Ks;t)  Qs;tKs;t = Xs;tKs;t  

 +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

Ks;t   '

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
2
Ks;t
+(1  ) (Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1])Ks;t + Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]

 +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

Ks;t:
Rearranging terms, it can be shown that Qs;t is a recursion:
Qs;t = Xs;t + (1  ) + 2'

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

+ '

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
2
: (37)
Since Qs;t is a function only of Xs;t and the expected discounted value of Qs;t+1, it does not
depend on the rms own Ks;t+1 or Is;t. Hence we verify that V (Ks;t) = Qs;tKs;t. Although
Qs;t does not depend on the rms individual Ks;t+1 or Is;t, in equilibrium it will be related
to the rms investment-capital ratio via:
Qs;t = Xs;t + (1  )

1 + 2'

Is;t
Ks;t
  

+ '

Is;t
Ks;t
2
  2'

Is;t
Ks;t

; (38)
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as can be veried by plugging (36) into (37). Note that (36) holds for the two representative
rms of each sector, i.e., QC;t and QH;t, thus we obtain (30) above.
With (38), it is straightforward to show how individuals can form expectations of AGt+1
and it+1 as a function of 
AG
t and 
i
t and aggregate shocks Zt+1. Given a grid of values for
Kt and St individuals can solve for KC;t and KH;t from KC;t = KtSt and KH;t = Kt (1  St).
Combining this with beliefs about Kt+1 from (29), individuals can solve for It  IC;t + IH;t
from Kt+1 = (1  )Kt+It. Given It and beliefs about
h
kt+k
t
(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)
i
from (29),
individuals can solve for IC;t and IH;t from (30). Given IH;t and the accumulation equation
KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t+IH;t; individuals can solve for KH;t+1: Given IC;t individuals can solve
for KC;t+1 using the accumulation equation KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t: Using KH;t+1 and
KC;t+1, individuals can solve for St+1: Given a grid of values for Ht, Ht+1 can be computed
from Ht+1 = (1  H)Ht + YH;t; where YH;t = ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

is obtained from
knowledge of ZH;t; KH;t (observable today), from the equilibrium condition Lt = L, and by
combining (22) and (24) to obtain the decomposition of Nt into NC;t and NH;t. Equation
(29) can be used directly to obtain beliefs about qt+1 and pHt+1.
To solve the dynamic programming problem individuals also need to know the equity
values VC;t and VH;t: But these come from knowledge of Qs;t (using (38)) and Ks;t via Vs;t =
Qs;tKs;t for s = C;H: Values for dividends in each sector are computed from
DC;t = YC;t   IC;t   wtNC;t   C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t;
DH;t = p
H
t YH;t   IH;t   pLt Lt   wtNH;t   H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t
and from
wt = (1  )Zj;tKj;tN j;t = (1  ) (1  ) pHt ZH;tLtK(1 )H;t N (1 ) H;t
and by again combining (22) and (24) to obtain the decomposition of Nt into NC;t and NH;t:
Finally, the evolution of the aggregate technology shocks Zt+1 is given by the rst-order
Markov chain described above; hence agents can compute the possible values of Zt+1 as a
function of Zt.
Values for it+1 = (Z
i
t+1;W
i
t+1; H
i
t+1) are given from all of the above in combination with
the rst order Markov process for idiosyncratic income log
 
Zia;t

= log
 
Zia 1;t 1

+ ia;t: Note
that H it+1 is a choice variable, while W
i
t+1 = 
i
t(VC;t+1 + VH;t+1 + DC;t+1 + DH;t+1) + B
i
t+1
requires knowing Vs;t+1 = Qs;t+1Ks;t+1 and Ds;t+1, s = C;H conditional on Zt+1:These in
turn depend on Is;t+1, s = C;H and may be computed in the manner described above by
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rolling forward one period both the equation for beliefs (29) and accumulation equations for
KC;t+1, and KH;t+1.
The individuals problem, as approximated above, may be summarized as follows (where
we drop age subscripts when no confusion arises and express trending variables as detrended):
a;t
 
AGt ; bF;t; bF;t+1; 
i
t

= max
hit+1;
i
t+1;b
i
t+1
U(cit; h
i
t) + iEt[a+1;t+1
 
AGt+1; bF;t; bF;t+1; 
i
t+1

] s:t:
(39)
The above problem is solved subject to (6), (7), (8), and (9) if the individual of working
age, and subject to the analogous versions of (6), (7), (8), and (9) (using pension income in
place of wage income), if the individual is retired. The problem is also solved subject to an
evolution equation for the state space:
AGt+1 =  
(n)(AGt ; Zt+1):
 (n) is the system of forecasting equations that is obtained by stacking all the beliefs from
(29) and accumulation equations into a single system. This dynamic programming problem
is quite complex numerically because of a large number of state variables but is otherwise
straightforward. Its implementation is described below.
Next we simulate the economy for a large number of individuals using the policy functions
from the dynamic programming problem. The continuum of individuals born each period is
approximated by a number large enough to insure that the mean and volatility of aggregate
variables is not a¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks. We check this by simulating the model
for successively larger numbers of individuals in each age cohort and checking whether the
mean and volatility of aggregate variables changes. We have solved the model for several
di¤erent numbers of agents. For numbers ranging from a total of 2,400 to 40,000 agents in
the population we found no signicant di¤erences in the aggregate allocations.
An additional numerical complication is that two markets (the housing and bond market)
must clear each period. This makes pHt and qt convenient state variables: the individuals
policy functions are a response to a menu of prices pHt and qt, Given values for YH;t, H
i
a+1;t+1,
H ia;t, B
i
a;t and B
F
t form the simulation, and given the menu of prices p
H
t and qt and the
beliefs (29), we then choose values for pHt+1 and qt+1 that clear markets in t+ 1. The initial
allocations of wealth and housing are set arbitrarily to insure that prices in the initial period
of the simulation, pH1 and q1, clear markets. However, these values are not used since each
simulation includes an initial burn-in period of 150 years that we discard for the nal results.
Using data from the simulation, we calculate (A1)-(A4) as linear functions of e{t and
an initial guess A(0). In particular, for every Zt and Zt+1 combination we regress (A1)-
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(A4) on Kt, St, Ht, pHt , and qt. This is used to calculate a new A
(n) = A(1) which is used
to re-solve for the entire equilibrium. We continue repeating this procedure, updating the
sequence

A(n)
	
; n = 0; 1; 2; ::: until (1) the coe¢ cients in A(n) between successive iterations
is arbitrarily small, (2) the regressions have high R2 statistics, and (3) the equilibrium is
invariant to the inclusion of additional state variables such as additional lags and/or higher
order moments of the cross-sectional wealth and housing distribution.
The R2 statistics for the four equations (A1)-(A4) are (.999, .999, .989, .998), respectively.
The lowest R2 is for the bond price equation. We found that successively increasing the
number of agents (beyond 2400) successively increases the R2 in the bond price equation,
without a¤ecting the equilibrium allocations or prices. However, we could not readily increase
the number of agents beyond 40,000 because attempts to do so exceeded the available memory
on a workstation computer. Our interpretation of this nding is that the equilibrium is
unlikely to be a¤ected by an approximation using more agents, even though doing so could
result in an improvement in the R2 of the bond equation. For this reason, and because
of the already high computational burden required to solve the model, we stopped at the
slightly lower level of accuracy for the bond forecasting regression as compared to the other
forecasting regressions.
Numerical Solution to Individuals Dynamic Programming Problem
We now describe how the individuals dynamic programming problem is solved.
First we choose grids for the continuous variables in the state space. That is we pick a
set of values for wi, hi, k, h, S, pH , and q. Because of the large number of state variables,
it is necessary to limit the number of grid points for some of the state variables given
memory/storage limitations. We found that having a larger number of grid points for the
individual state variables was far more important than for the aggregate state variables, in
terms of the e¤ect it had on the resulting allocations. Thus we use a small number of grid
points for the aggregate state variables but compensate by judiciously choosing the grid point
locations after an extensive trial and error experimentation designed to use only those points
that lie in the immediate region where the state variables ultimately reside in the computed
equilibria. As such, a larger number of grid points for the aggregate state variables was
found to produce very similar results to those reported using only a small number of points.
We pick 25 points for wit, 12 points for h
i
t, three points for kt, ht, St, p
H
t , bF;t, bF;t+1 and
four points for qt. The grid for wi starts at the borrowing constraint and ends far above
the maximum wealth reached in simulation. This grid is very dense around typical values of
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nancial wealth and is sparser for high values. The housing grid is constructed in the same
way.
Given the grids for the state variables, we solve the individuals problem by value function
iteration, starting for the oldest (age A) individual and solving backwards. The oldest
individuals value function for the period after death is zero for all levels of wealth and
housing (alternately it could correspond to an exogenously specied bequest motive). Hence
the value function in the nal period of life is given by A = maxhit+1;it+1;bit+1 U(c
i
A; h
i
A) subject
to the constraints above for (39). Given A (calculated for every point on the state space),
we then use this function to solve the problem for a younger individual (aged A   1). We
continue iterating backwards until we have solved the youngest individuals (age 1) problem.
We use piecewise cubic splines (Fortran methods PCHIM and CHFEV) to interpolate points
on the value function. Any points that violate a constraint are assigned a large negative
value.
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Figure 1: Foreign Holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies
The figure plots foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries (squares) and U.S. Agencies (circles). U.S. Agencies denotes both the corporate
bonds issued by the Government Sponsored Enterprizes and the mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by them. The solid lines denote
the amount of long-term and short-term holdings, in billions of U.S. dollars, as measured against the left axis. The dashed lines denote
the long-term foreign holdings relative to the total amount of outstanding long-term (marketable) debt. The data are from the U.S.
Treasury International Capital System’s annual survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities. The foreign holdings data are
available for December 1974, 1978, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, March 2000, and annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
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Figure 2: Foreign Holdings Relative to U.S. Trend GDP
The solid line denotes foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies relative to U.S. trend GDP (squares). Trend GDP is computed
with a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The dashed line (stars) asks what the foreign holdings relative to trend GDP would have been if the
foreign holdings relative to the amount of debt outstanding declined the amount they did, but the amount of debt outstanding relative
to trend GDP was held at 2008 values for the years 2009 and 2010. The foreign holdings data are available for December 1974, 1978,
1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, March 2000, and annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
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Figure 3: Net Foreign Holdings Relative to U.S. Trend GDP
The solid line (squares) denotes total net foreign holdings of long-term securities (the net foreign liability position of the U.S.) relative
to U.S. trend GDP. Net foreign holdings are defined as foreign holdings of U.S. securities minus U.S. holdings of foreign securities. All
U.S. holdings of foreign securities classify as risky holdings because they carry at least exchange rate risk. We define as safe the foreign
holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies. The dashed line denotes the thus constructed net foreign holdings in risky assets (circles),
while the dotted line (stars) denotes the net foreign holdings in safe assets. The data are from the U.S. Treasury International Capital
System’s annual survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities. The data are available for December 1994, December 1997, March
2000, and annually from June 2002 until June 2010.
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Figure 4: Welfare by Age
The left (right) panel plots the EV of an increase (decrease) in foreign holdings by age. The dashed line (circles) is the EV integrated
out against the distribution of last period’s bond holdings bF,t. In particular, the dashed lines report for all age buckets (denoted by
subscript a) the following welfare measure:
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where the change ∆ in foreign holdings relative to trend GDP is set to equal ∆ = (1− ρF ) b + ρF bF,t + σF · 1 (increase) or ∆ =
(1− ρF ) b + ρF bF,t + σF · (−1) (decrease). Under the calibration discussed in the text, ∆ = 2% in quintile 1 (1.7% at the average) in
the left panel and -2.2% in quintile 5 (-1.8% at the average) in the right panel. The solid line (squares) in each panel is the EV when
the previous-period’s holdings bF,t are in either the lowest, bF1, quintile (left panel) or the highest, bF10 quintile (right panel); i.e., the
solid line reports
EVa|bF1 =
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in the left panel and analogously for the highest quintile in the right panel. The age buckets are 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80,
81 and above.
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Figure 5: Welfare by Age, Income, and Financial Wealth
The left (right) panel plots the EV of a decrease in foreign holdings by age for various income (net worth) groups. The solid line (squares)
in the left (right) panel is the EV for those households in a given age bucket that are in the lowest one-third of income (net worth).
The dashed line (circles) is the EV for those households in a given age bucket that are in the middle one-third of income (wealth).
The dotted line (diamonds) is the EV for those households in a given age bucket that are in the middle one-third of income (wealth).
The EV integrates out against the distribution of current-period and previous-period foreign bond holdings. The age buckets are 21-30,
31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, 81 and above.
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Figure 6: Welfare for Newborns
The figure plots the EV of a large decline in foreign holdings for a newborn (under the veil of ignorance). The measure compares the
value function of a newborn, born in the 5th quintile of current foreign holdings bF,t+1 = b5, to the welfare of a newborn, born in a
world with current holdings in each of the other quintiles bF,t+1 = bFi, for i = 1, · · · , 5 (indicated by diamonds):
EV 0(bi) =
∫ 

(
v¯0
(
bF,t, bFi, 1, 0, h¯0
)
v¯0
(
bF,t, bF5, 1, 0, h¯0
)
) σ
σ−1
− 1

 dbF,t,
where h¯0 is the age-0 housing wealth agents are born with (the lowest point on the housing grid). The EV integrates out against the
distribution of previous-period holdings bF,t. The fifth point (most to the right) is 0 by construction.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
Production
1 {φC (·) , φH (·)} adj. cost fcn. 2
2 δ deprec., KC ,KH 12%
3 δH depreciation, H 2.5%
4 α capital share, YC 0.36
5 ν capital share, YH 0.30
6 φ non-land share in construction 0.90
Preferences
7 1/σ risk aversion 8
8 β time disc factor 0.9
9 ε elast of sub, C, H 1
10 χ weight on C 0.70
Demographics and Income
11 Ga age earnings profile SCF
12 πa+1|a survival prob mortality tables
13 σE st. dev ind earnings in boom 0.0768
14 σR st. dev ind earnings in bust 0.1298
Transaction costs and collateral constraint
15 F equity mkt fixed participation cost 1% C
i
16 ψ0 housing mkt fixed transaction cost 2.7%C
i
17 ψ1 housing mkt variable transaction cost 4.3%
18 ̟ minimum combined downpayment 15%
Foreign Holdings
19 b mean for. holdings/trend GDP 0.148
20 ρF persistence for. holdings/trend GDP 0.95
21 σF innovation volatility for.holdings/trend GDP 1.7%
Table 2: Real Business Cycle Moments
Panel A denotes business cycle statistics in annual U.S. data from 1953 until 2010. The data combine information from NIPA Tables
1.1.5, 3.9.5, and 2.3.5. Output (Y = YC + p
HYH + CH ) is gross domestic product minus government expenditures. Total consumption
(CT ) is total private sector consumption (housing and non-housing). Housing consumption (CH = R ∗H) is consumption of housing
services. Non-housing consumption (C) is total private sector consumption minus housing services. Housing investment (pHYH ) is
residential investment. Non-housing investment (I) is the sum of private sector non-residential structures, equipment and software, and
changes in inventory. Total investment is denoted IT (residential and non-housing). Net exports are -0.02 of GDP on average, and are
not reported in the table. For each series in the data, we first deflate by the disposable personal income deflator, We then construct the
trend with a Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter with parameter λ = 100. Finally, we construct detrended data as the log difference between
the raw data and the HP trend, multiplied by 100. The standard deviation (first column), correlation with GDP (second column), and
the first-order autocorrelation are all based on these detrended series. The autocorrelation AC is a one-year correlation in data and
model. The share of GDP (fourth column) is based on the raw data. Panel B denotes the same statistics for the benchmark model.
Panel A: Data (1953-2010)
st.dev. corr. w. GDP AC share of gdp
Y 2.57 1.00 0.45 1.00
CT 1.91 0.89 0.65 0.82
C 2.13 0.89 0.63 0.67
CH 1.33 0.57 0.67 0.14
IT 8.75 0.92 0.39 0.20
I 8.99 0.84 0.32 0.14
pHYH 14.30 0.68 0.61 0.06
Panel B: Model
st.dev. corr. w. GDP AC share of gdp
Y 2.74 1.00 0.11 1.00
CT 2.12 0.91 0.02 0.72
C 2.01 0.85 0.03 0.47
CH 2.62 0.89 0.02 0.24
IT 8.74 0.77 0.01 0.28
I 9.00 0.78 0.03 0.23
pHYH 13.48 0.41 0.05 0.05
Table 3: Quantities by Foreign Holdings
The table reports the first and second moments of real quantities by level of and changes in foreign holdings in the model. The quantity
variables are as defined in Table 2. Panel A reports means of the quantity variables, whereas Panel B reports standard deviations. In
each panel, the “all” column reports the unconditional moment from a long simulation. The column “high BF,t” (“low BF,t” ) reports
the conditional moment of the dated-t variable, conditional on the foreign holdings level bF,t, which was chosen at time t− 1, being in
the highest (lowest) 1/2 of observations on the level of foreign holdings in the same long simulation. The column “high ∆BF ” (“low
∆BF ” ) reports the conditional moment of the dated-t variable, conditional on the foreign holdings change ∆bF = bF,t+1− bF,t, which
is known at time t, being in the highest (lowest) 1/2 of observations on the change in foreign holdings in the same long simulation.
Panel A: Mean Panel B: Standard deviation
all bF,t H bF,t L ∆bF H ∆bF L all bF,t H bF,t L ∆bF H ∆bF L
Y 2.28 2.30 2.27 2.29 2.28 2.74 2.72 2.75 2.67 2.78
CT 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.65 1.62 2.12 2.15 2.07 1.95 1.91
C 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.06 2.01 2.06 1.95 1.82 1.69
CH 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 2.62 2.61 2.63 2.47 2.61
IT 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.69 0.60 8.74 8.95 8.49 5.79 7.42
I 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.56 0.49 9.00 9.29 8.67 6.53 7.90
pHYH 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 13.48 13.28 13.65 10.59 12.24
Table 4: Sensitivity to Changes in Foreign Holdings
The second and third columns report the slope coefficients βF,t and β∆bF of a multiple regression of the log change in a variable between
t+1 and t on a constant, the foreign holdings level bF,t (chosen in period t-1), and the foreign holdings flow between t and t+1 ∆bF,t+1:
logXt+1 − logXt = α+ βF bF,t + β∆bF∆bF,t+1 + ǫt.
The constant in the regression is omitted. The first seven rows are the same real variables defined in Table 2 (not HP de-trended). The
left-hand side variables in the eighth and ninth rows are the growth rate in the beginning-of-period capital (logKt+2 − logKt+1) and
housing stock (logHt+2− logHt+1), respectively. The tenth row is the aggregate wage, the eleventh row the aggregate house value, and
the last row the aggregate mutual fund capitalization.
Var βF β∆bF
Panel A: RBC Moments
1. Y −0.01 0.19
2. CT −0.03 0.57
3. C −0.04 0.65
4. CH −0.02 0.40
5. IT −0.19 3.88
6. I −0.17 3.64
7. pHYH −0.24 4.98
8. K 0.00 0.45
9. H 0.02 0.08
10. W 0.00 0.12
Panel B: Asset Prices
11. pHH −0.09 1.91
12. V −0.07 1.72
Table 5: Asset Pricing Moments
The second column (data 1) reports the observed asset pricing moments, listed in the first column, in annual 1953-2010 data. The
equity return RS is the value-weighted CRSP stock market return minus the realized inflation rate over the course of the year. The
risk-free rate is measured as the nominal yield on a one-year government bond from the CRSP Fama-Bliss data set in the last month
of the preceding year minus the realized inflation rate over the course of the year. The price deflator is the same as in Table 2. The
housing return RH in data1 is the aggregate value of residential real estate wealth in the fourth quarter of the year from the Flow of
Funds plus the consumption of housing services summed over the four quarters of the year from NIPA divided by the value of residential
real estate in the fourth quarter of the preceding year. We subtract inflation to express the return in real terms and population growth
in order to correct for the growth in housing quantities due to population growth. The third column reports moments for the annual
1976-2010 sample. The housing return in data 2 uses the seasonally adjusted repeat-sale national house price index from Core Logic
and the seasonally-adjusted rental price index for shelter from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It assumes a price-rent ratio in 1975
equal to the one in data 1. We then use the quarterly price and rent indices to construct quarterly returns and price-rent ratios over the
1976-2010 period. We construct annual returns by compounding the quarterly returns during the year. We subtract realized inflation
from realized housing returns to form real housing returns. The stock return and risk-free rate in data 2 are the same as in data 1, but
measured over the shorter sample. The fourth column reports the unconditional asset pricing moments from a long simulation of the
model. The fifth (sixth) column reports the same time-t moments, but conditional on being in the highest 1/2 (lowest 1/2) of foreign
holdings levels bF,t, chosen at t-1. The seventh (eight) column reports the same time-t moments, but conditional on being in the highest
1/2 (lowest 1/2) of foreign holdings changes ∆bF,t between t-1 and t. For example, the last column, seventh row reports the equity risk
premium (the time-t expectation of the excess return between t and t+1), conditional on having experienced a foreign outflow between
t-1 and t. The first and second rows reports first and second moments of the one-period risk-free rate. The third and fourth (fifth and
sixth) rows report first and second moments of the unlevered (levered) physical capital return (i.e., stock market return). The seventh
row reports the average excess return, i.e., in excess of the riskfree rate. The eight row reports the Sharpe ratio, defined as the average
excess return divided by the standard deviation of the excess return. Rows nine through twelve report the analogous return moments
for the aggregate housing market. For columns five through 8, row thirteen (fourteen) reports the change in the house price-rent ratio
(stock market price-dividend ratio), measured as the percentage change relative to the “all” periods sample in column 4.
data 1 data 2 all bF,t H bF,t L ∆bF H ∆bF L
1. E[Rf ] 1.86 2.29 1.60 1.02 2.19 −2.06 5.25
2. Std[Rf ] 2.06 2.28 4.85 4.82 4.79 2.63 3.61
3. E[RK ] 4.29 4.05 4.51 1.09 7.47
4. Std[RK ] 6.80 7.05 6.53 5.67 6.32
5. E[RS ] 8.73 9.35 6.08 6.08 6.06 3.18 8.95
6. Std[RS ] 18.78 17.38 9.59 10.02 9.14 8.85 9.44
7. E[RS −Rf ] 6.87 7.06 4.48 5.06 3.87 5.24 3.70
8. SR[RS ] 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.56 0.47 0.61 0.42
9. E[RH ] 11.20 9.83 11.33 11.08 11.56 7.95 14.68
10. Std[RH ] 5.82 7.55 7.04 7.09 6.99 5.73 6.60
11. E[RH −Rf ] 9.35 7.54 9.72 10.06 9.38 10.01 9.43
12. SR[RH ] 1.55 0.94 1.78 1.81 1.76 1.90 1.67
13. ∆
(
pH/R
)
−− 1.02 −1.02 2.48 −2.46
14. ∆ (V/D) −− 11.35 −11.35 44.76 −44.69
